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Abstract
Within the context of the neoclassical growth model I investigate the impli-
cations of (initial) endowment inequality when the rich have a higher marginal
savings rate than the poor. More unequal societies grow faster in the transition
process, and therefore exhibit a higher speed of convergence. Furthermore, there
is divergence in consumption and lifetime wealth if the rich exhibit a higher in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Unlike the Solow-Stiglitz model, the steady state is always unique although
the consumption function is concave.
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1 Introduction
Rich people save more. But does this fact imply that inequality will increase forever
over time? Moreover, how does such savings behavior affect the growth path? Tackling
these questions is a priori a complex task: On the one hand, inequality affects capital
accumulation when the marginal propensities to consume (MPC) differ. On the other
hand, inequality itself changes through the accumulation process because savings rates
differ and the factor prices change. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze this
relationship within the context (of the neoclassical growth model) with perfect and
complete markets.
Theoretical reasoning that savings propensities increase with wealth date back at
least to Fisher (1930) and Keynes (1936). Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that
when agents are subject to uninsurable risks or liquidity constraints the consumption
function is concave expect for special cases. The empirical relevance of increasing
MPC is unquestioned. Looking at household data, it is a well established fact that
rich people save more - not only on average but also at the margin - out of wealth
or permanent income, see the paper by Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) and their
references.1
What are the macroeconomic effects of increasing MPC? To make our point as
simple as possible, we do our analysis under full certainty but where the different
MPC arise due to non-homothetic preferences. To the best of my knowledge there
is so far no study of inequality and growth when consumers save optimally and the
1Perhaps unsurpringly, the empirical picture is less clear on the aggregate level. The differences
between studies are due to different data sets and different approaches to tackle the endogeneity
problems. Although Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) and Li and Zou (2004) could not find a robust
effect of inequality on saving, Cook (1995) and Smith (2001) found a positive effect of inequality on
(private) saving rates. The well-known studies of Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) obtain a positive
inequality growth relationship, at least for rich countries. This is also consistent with the view that
inequality raises savings.
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resulting consumption function is concave. Stiglitz (1969) studied the dynamics of
distribution when savings are exogenously given linear function of wealth. Chatterjee
(1994), Caselli and Ventura (2001) and Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimueller (2006, Chap.
3) study the same question in a Ramsey model where the linear savings rule is a result of
dynamic optimization. The impact of concave consumption functions for the evolution
of inequality and growth was previously studied by Bourguignon (1981) and Schlicht
(1975) in the context of the Solow-Stiglitz model with exogenous savings propensities.
Bourguignon (1981) shows that multiple steady states may emerge which can be pareto-
ranked. In this paper, convex savings are the result of a dynamic optimization with
intertemporally separable preferences. Surprisingly, the analysis is much simplified:
the steady state equilibrium is unique and independent of the initial distribution. This
result implies that more unequal societies must exhibit a higher speed of convergence
because they grow faster in the transition process.
A related important strand of the literature is the work by Becker (1980), Lucas
and Stokey (1984) and, more recently, Sorger (2002). They study conditions when the
long run distribution of wealth is non-degenerate in steady state. Furthermore, Bliss
(2004) analyzes a general class of preferences to study whether convergence occurs in
the accumulation process. However, the focus of these papers is not to analyze the
impact of inequality on growth.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Both the compet-
itive equilibrium and the social planner’s solution are analyzed. Section 3 then presents
a numerical simulation and in the final section 4 the differences to the Bourguignon’s
model are discussed.
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2 The model
2.1 Set-up
Preferences All consumers have the same intertemporal additive preferences and
the same discount rate. The time horizon is infinite. Hence, the intertemporal utility
function is given by
Ui =
Z ∞
0
e−ρtu(ci(t))dt (1)
where ci(t) denotes consumption of individual i at date t. We assume that (i) u(·) is
twice continuously differentiable above some (subsistence) level c¯ ≥ 0. (ii) We take
the usual assumption that u0 > 0 > u00, i.e. marginal utility is declining but the
individual is non-satiated (at least over the relevant range). (iii) Further we assume
limc→c¯ u0(c) =∞. Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that the elasticity of substitution is
positive for all c > c¯ :
− u
0(c)
u00(c)c
> 0 for c > c¯ ≥ 0.
Individual factor endowments We assume that - at date 0 - household i is en-
dowed with li units of labor, which is assumed to be constant over time, and ki(0)
units of capital. We restrict the inequality in the way that all households are viable,
i.e., each household can afford to consume more than c¯ in every period of time. We will
come back to this assumption below. The number of households is constant. Hence
total amount of labor L is also constant and we normalize it to one. Hence, the total
amount of labor and capital in the economy is given by
K ≡
Z
N
ki(t)dPi
1 ≡
Z
N
lidPi
where N denotes the set of families and dPi the size of family i.
4
Technology and competitive factor rewards The inputs labor and capital are
used to produce a homogenous output good Y which can be both used for consump-
tion and investment. Production takes place with a standard neoclassical production
function with constant returns to scale. There is no technological progress, i.e., we
focus on transitional dynamics only.2
Y (t) = F (K(t), 1) ≡ f(K(t))
The factors are rewarded their marginal products, hence the interest rate and the wage
rate are given by
r(t) = f 0(K(t)) (2)
w(t) = f(K(t))−K(t)f 0(K(t))
and are uniquely determined by the current capital stock K(t).
2.2 The social planner’s problem
Before turning to the market equilibrium it is useful to consider the social planner’s
problem. The planner assigns welfare weights ωi to the individuals which are pinned
down by the (initial) distribution of ki and li in the decentralized optimum analyzed
in the next section.3 Setting up the current value Hamiltonian with {ci(t)} as control
and K(t) as state variable
H =
Z
N
ωiu(ci(t))dPi + λ(t)K˙(t)
subject to the capital accumulation constraint (the output good can be used both for
consumption and investment)
K˙(t) = f(K(t))−
Z
N
ci(t)dPi (3)
2As is well known, with positive growth we get steady states only if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is constant, i.e., utility is CRRA.
3 In a decentralized equilibrium, consumption depends monotonically on lifetime resources - which
in turn are determined by the initial distribution of ki and li . Hence for each distribution of lifetime
resources there is a distribution of welfare weights ωi such as to mimic the decentralized solution.
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leads to the first order conditions
ωiu0(ci(t))− λ(t) = 0 (4)
and
ρλ(t)− λ˙(t) = λ(t)f 0(K(t)). (5)
We may disregard the Kuhn-Tucker conditions because of the Inada conditions and
the distributional assumptions. The first order conditions (4) and (5) and the capital
accumulation equation (3) give the standard pair of differential equations, we omit
time indices,
λ˙
λ
= ρ− f 0(K) (6)
K˙ = f(K)−
Z
N
c(ωi, λ)dPi
where c(ωi, λ) is implicitly defined by ωiu0(ci) = λ. Figure 1 depicts equations (6)
with K on the horizontal and λ on the vertical axis. The λ˙ = 0 locus is vertical at
f 0(K) = ρ, and the K˙ = 0 locus is monotonically decreasing as c(ωi, λ) is decreasing in
λ. The system has a unique saddle path with negative slope. Hence the policy function
λ(K) is uniquely determined.
Figure 1
2.3 The decentralized equilibrium
Markets are perfect and complete. We assume that each household is able to consume
more than c¯. All individuals face the same factor prices, thus the household’s income
is given by w(t)li + r(t)ki(t). The evolution of individual wealth then reads k˙i(t) =
w(t)li+r(t)ki(t)−ci(t). Imposing the transversality condition we get the intertemporal
budget constraint. The utility maximization problem of the consumer reads
max
{ci(t)}
Z ∞
0
e−ρtu(ci(t))dt s.t.
Z ∞
0
e−R(t)ci(t)dt ≤ ki(0) +
Z ∞
0
e−R(t)w(t)lidt
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where R(t) =
R t
0 r(s)ds. The first order condition reads
e−ρtu0(ci(t))− μie−R(t) = 0
where μi denotes the marginal utility of wealth. Differentiating the first order condition
of this problem with respect to time we get the familiar Euler equation
c˙i(t) = −
u0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))
(r(t)− ρ) . (7)
It is easy to see that the FOC of the decentralized equilibrium are equivalent to
those of the social planner’s problem. Differentiating (4) with respect to time, we get
c˙i = λ˙u0(ci)/ (λu00(ci)) . Using (6) to replace λ˙/λ, immediately leaves us with the Euler
equation (7). The resource constraint is clearly the same in both cases. Hence, the
decentralized equilibrium is unique and pareto efficient.
Aggregating (7) we obtain the equation of motion for aggregate consumption C
C˙(t) = (r(t)− ρ)
Z
N
− u
0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))
dPi. (8)
Equation (8) already allows us to determine how inequality affects consumption growth
and the savings rate.
Lemma 1 Iff ci(0) > cj(0), then ci(t) ≥ cj(t) ∀t.
Proof. We prove the claim by contradiction. Assume that ci(t1) < cj(t1) at some
date t1. By (7) c˙i is a continuous function of ci. This implies that ci is continuous in
time. Hence, ∃t0 < t1 where ci(t0) = cj(t0). From (7) we have c˙i(t) = c˙j(t) for ∀t > t0,
and therefore, ci(t) = cj(t) for ∀t > t0. This contradicts the initial assumption and the
Lemma follows.
Lemma 2 Individual consumption is monotonically increasing in wealth ki(0)+
R∞
0 e
−R(t)w(t)lidt.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that a poorer agent’s consumption today is higher
than that of a richer agent. Lemma 1 implies that the poor’s consumption will not be
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lower than of the rich in the future. As the rich agent’s intertemporal budget constraint
is satisfied with equality, the poor would violate his budget constraint.
Lemma 3 If −u0(c)/u00(c) is convex, consumption is a concave function of wealth.
Proof. Define ai(0) ≡ ki(0)+
R∞
0 e
−R(t)w(t)lidt.We differentiate the intertemporal
budget with respect to wealth and get (individual indices i omitted)
dc(0)
da(0)
=
∙Z ∞
0
e−R(t)
∂c(t)
∂c(0)
dt
¸−1
d2c(0)
da(0)2
= −
µ
dc(0)
da(0)
¶−1 Z ∞
0
e−R(t)
∂2c(t)
∂c(0)2
dt
If c˙ is convex in c, c(t) must be convex in c(0), i.e., ∂2c(t)/∂c(0)2 > 0. By (7) we know
that c˙ is convex iff −u0(c)/u00(c) is convex. By Lemma 2 dc(0)/da(0) > 0, this implies
d2c(0)/da(0)2 < 0.
Proposition 1 If −u0(c)/u00(c) is convex, more unequal societies (measured in terms
of wealth) have a higher savings rate and grow faster.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, a regressive transfer in wealth decreases aggregate
consumption. A second order stochastic dominance shift in the ci− distribution in-
creases
R
N −
u0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))dPi when −u
0(c)/u00(c) is convex. Hence, consumption growth in
(8) is higher with a more unequal wealth distribution.
As a corollary note that −u0(c)/u00(c) being concave would imply that more unequal
societies save less. Finally, savings are independent of distribution when −u0(c)/u00(c)
is linear. This is the well known result that income distribution has no effect on
accumulation when preferences take the HARA (hyperbolic risk aversion) form.
At the same time we are able to draw conclusions on the evolution of the consump-
tion and the wealth distribution.
Proposition 2 Consumption and wealth inequality increases (decreases) in a growing
economy if the elasticity of substitution −u0(c)/u00(c)c increases (decreases) in c.
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Proof. From (7) we see that the growth rate of individual consumption c˙i/ci
increases in ci when −u0(c)/u00(c)c increases (decreases) in c. Wealth inequality moves
pari passu with consumption inequality since consumption is monotone in wealth.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, the condition on the evolution of inequality is
not directly related to the concavity of the consumption function. The concavity of
the consumption function is a statement on marginal propensities to save. Instead,
the evolution of the wealth and consumption inequality is governed by differences in
saving rates, i.e. the average propensities to save. To take an example, when the
consumption function is linear but exhibits a positive axis intercept due to subsistence
consumption inequality will widen over time. This is the case with Stone-Geary utility
u(c) = ln(c − c¯), for example. Intuitively, the subsistence consumption level forces a
poor individual to save only little today which implies that the subsequent growth rate
of wealth and consumption is lower for the poor.
2.3.1 Steady State
As there is no technical progress, the economy will be in steady state when C, Y, and
K are constant. Setting λ˙ = 0 and K˙ = 0 in (6) yields us the steady state value of the
interest rate and the consumption level
r∗ = f 0(K∗) = ρ
C∗ = f(K∗).
Hence, we see that the steady state capital stock is unique and independent of the
distribution.4 This is a sharp difference to Bourguignon’s (1981) result. In a model
with optimizing agents the macroeconomic analysis of increasing marginal savings on
individual level turns out to be much simpler. Since individual consumption increases
- although the growth rate may differ because of the varying intertemporal rate of
4Although the aggregate values of K and C are unique, the individual ci− and ki−distribution is
indeterminate and is governed by the initial distribution (see Sorger, 2002).
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substitution - if the interest rate exceeds the rate of time preference, there must be a
unique stationary steady state. For any (separable) utility function (1) it is optimal
to choose a constant consumption flow only if r = ρ.
A further difference to the Bourguignon-Solow model concerns welfare. Bour-
guignon’s (1981) analysis of the Solow model with convex savings suggests that the
poor might indirectly gain from redistribution. He showed that inegalitarian steady
states may occur where consumption of the rich and the poor is higher than in an egali-
tarian steady state. More inequality raises savings and investment and therefore wages
as the economy produces more capital intensive. This mechanism is the reason why the
consumption levels of the poor and the rich are higher in the inegalitarian steady state
than in the egalitarian one. Hence, the inegalitarian steady state is ”pareto-dominant”.
(Of course such a comparison is not possible since there are no utility functions in the
Solow model and the transitional process would have to be taken into account). In the
Ramsey model, however, the equilibrium allocation is always pareto optimal. The well
known reason lies in the fact markets are perfect and complete. Out of steady state,
however, the welfare level of agent i increases, if inequality at date 0 is higher because
of a regressive transfer between other agents. The reason is that the economy grows
faster. Obviously, this is not a Pareto improvement since the agent, whom is taken
wealth of in the regressive transfer, is worse off.
2.4 Speed of convergence
We saw that all economies converge to the same steady state but unequal economies
grow faster in the transitional process. To bring these two results together we must
follow that more unequal societies exhibit a higher speed of convergence towards the
steady state. To calculate the speed of convergence K˙(t)/ (K(t)−K∗) we linearize the
economy around its steady state
C˙(t)
C(t)−C∗
∼= K˙(t)
K(t)−K∗
∼= μ ≡ 1
2
"
ρ−
s
ρ2 − 4f 00(K∗)
Z
N
u0(c∗i )
u00(c∗i )
dPi
#
. (9)
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The derivation of equation (9) is shown in the appendix. The following proposition
proves our intuition.
Proposition 3 More unequal societies exhibit a higher speed of convergence.
Proof. An increase in income dispersion increases
R
N −
u0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))dPi and increases
the absolute value of μ.
Along the same lines, we get the expressions for the evolution of aggregate con-
sumption and capital stock around the steady state
C(t)−C∗
C∗
∼=
Z
N
− u
0(c∗i )
u00(c∗i )c
∗
i
c∗i
C∗
dPi
f 00(K∗)
μ
eμt
K(0)−K∗
K∗
K(t)−K∗
K∗
∼= eμt
K(0)−K∗
K∗
.
This analysis was restricted to a neighborhood of the steady state. In particular, the
consumption inequality is evaluated at its steady state level. Hence, the linearization
does not allow for "feedback" effects of income distribution on growth and vice versa.
To study the dynamics outside of steady state we therefore have to refer to numerical
simulations which is done in section 3.
3 Numerical exercise
To study the quantitative effects involved we perform a simple quantitative exercise.
Let marginal utility be given by u0(c) = (cγ − 1)−σ where a consumption of unity
may be interpreted as the subsistence level and γ > 1. It is easy to show that the
resulting consumption function is concave in wealth when the interest rate exceeds the
rate of time preference. Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution −u0(c)/u00(c)c is
increasing in consumption. The preference parameters are chosen as ρ = 0.02, σ = 2,
and γ = 0.01. The new parameter γ determines the concavity of the consumption
function. The MPC will react more strongly to changes in wealth the higher γ is. The
aggregate production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form, Y = Kα. The capital share
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is given by α = 0.33. Hence the steady states values of capital and consumption are
given by K∗ = (α/ρ)1/(1−α) = 65.6 and C∗ = (K∗)α = 3.94.
To simplify things further we assume that there are only two groups in the popu-
lation: β poor and 1 − β rich agents. According to Wolff (1998), the top 20% in the
US population own about 80% of financial wealth. To match the (financial) wealth
distribution, let β = 0.8 be the group size of the poor and we choose the following
individual wealth levels at date 0: kP (0) = 10 and kR(0) = 110. Hence, with this spec-
ification, the richest 20% own 73% of aggregate wealth. The aggregate capital stock
equals K(0) = 30 or around 45% of its steady state value. The only free parameter
left is the distribution of wage incomes (labor endowments). In the low inequality
simulation we chose lP = 0.8 (a poor individual earns 80% of average wage income)
whereas in the high inequality case we set lP = 0.5.
Table 1, F igure 2
How well can this simple model with perfect markets account for differences in savings
rates? The difficulties in estimating cross country relationships between inequality
and savings rates notwithstanding, Smith (2001) estimated that an increase in the
Gini coefficient by one standard deviation or 10 percentage points results is associated
with a 1.5% increase in the country’s savings rate. In Table 1 we see that, with the
values of the parameters chosen, an increase in the consumption Gini by 10 percentage
points the savings rate increases by 0.6 - 1 percentage points,5 with higher marginal
effects for higher levels of inequality. Although no elements of uncertainty are present,
the model is able to generate reasonable quantitative effects. Further, the simulation
shows the evolution of inequality and in particular the influence of higher savings rates
of the rich. The positive subsistence consumption c¯ = 1 forces the poor to choose a
5Note that we evaluate the savings rates at the starting point of the transition process. Obviously,
as the economy moves closer to the steady state the savings rates decline and equal zero in steady
state.
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flat consumption path (see Figure 2) which results in a slow accumulation of assets.
For the high inequality specification the poor’s assets in steady state are even lower
than at the starting date (see Table 1, last column).
4 Conclusion
We analyzed the macroeconomic implications of increasing marginal savings propensi-
ties. With optimal savings and infinite horizons the equilibrium sequences of interest
rates and wages are unique and pareto-efficient. If savings are convex, more inequality
leads to a higher speed of convergence. This holds true although inequality affects
accumulation in the transition path with a general utility function u(c).These results
stand in a sharp contrast to Bourguignon’s findings when assuming exogenous convex
savings behavior. Intuitively, the extreme differences in the outcomes are analogous
to the comparison of the Ramsey and the OLG model: The Solow-Stiglitz model with
exogenous savings can be rationalized by an OLG economy with (warm glow) be-
quests. In OLG models, multiple steady states may emerge as new generations enter
and agents have finite horizons. In this paper, horizons are infinite which precludes
multiple equilibria. However, this conjecture needs to be explored.
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5 Appendix
To derive the speed of convergence, we take a first-order Taylor approximation around
the steady state (where f 0(K) = ρ). For the evolution of individual consumption (7)
we get
c˙i ∼=
∂c˙i
∂ci
[ci − c∗i ] +
∂c˙i
∂K
[K −K∗]
= f 00(K)
u0(ci)
u00(ci)
[K −K∗] .
By aggregation we get the evolution of aggregate consumption (note that
·
C =
·
C − C∗)
·
C − C∗ ∼= f 00(K)
Z
N
u0(ci)
u00(ci)
dPi [K −K∗] . (A1)
In the same way we approximate the capital accumulation equation K˙ = f(K)− C,
·
K −K∗ ∼= ρ [K −K∗]− [C − C∗] . (A2)
As (A1) and (A2) are linear in C and K, the growth rates of [C − C∗] and [K −K∗]
coincide. The solution of this log linearized system is (9).
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Table 1: Calibration 
 
 High inequality Low inequality Representative 
Agent 
Initial values    
Labor endowment lP 0.5 0.8 1 
Asset endowment kP(0) 10 10 30 
Asset endowment kR(0) 110 110 30 
    
Consumption of the poor cP(0) 1.367 1.912 2.652 
Consumption of the rich cR(0) 7.320 5.430 2.652 
Aggregate consumption C(0) 2.557 2.615 2.652 
Consumption GINI 37.2 21.5 0 
Savings rate 16.8% 14.9% 13.7% 
    
Steady State    
Consumption of the poor cP* 1.512 2.421 3.940 
Consumption of the rich cR* 13.799 10.018 3.940 
Aggregate consumption C* 3.940 3.940 3.940 
Assets of the poor kP* 9.70 16.16 64.74 
Assets of the rich kR* 289.38 263.44 64.74 
 
Figure 1: Phase Diagram 
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Figure 2: Dynamics of individual variables 
for low initial inequality 
 
Evolution of consumption
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 10
0
Cons Poor
Cons Rich
Evolution of financial wealth
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 10
0
Capital Poor
Capital Rich
 
